“Speaking Truth to Power?” Intellectuals in Iraqi Baathist Cultural Production by Tramontini, Leslie
How free can intellectuals (writers, poets, 
and artists) be in a political system that 
exercises a huge amount of pressure, 
control, and censorship, forcing them to 
conform to its heavily skewed ideologi-
cal and historical perspectives? The core 
question of a dispute among Iraqi intel-
lectuals since 2003 has been: Who has 
the right to speak for Iraq? This question 
underlines the need to delve deeper; it 
touches upon the urgency of re-examin-
ing the political and cultural dynamics of 
Baathist rule, the cultural institutions of 
which provided a restrictive framework 
within an overall atmosphere of intimida-
tion, control, and surveillance. During this 
time, Iraqi intellectuals took on various 
attitudes, varying from compliance and 
collaboration, to resistance to the system 
or outright exile. The rift between Iraqi 
intellectuals is mostly between those on 
the “inside” and those on the “outside.” 
This paper discusses the relationship be-
tween intellectuals and power and the 
peculiarities of Iraqi cultural production 
in Baathist times, and then analyses the 
role of intellectuals through two case 
studies, debating the strategies of sur-
vival and complicity.1
Intellectuals and Power 
Who has the right to speak for Iraq? In the 
dispute among Iraqi intellectuals who be-
long to the “inside” and those who belong 
to the “outside,” there is, however, no clear 
line between the two—although this is the 
terminology used by Iraqis themselves. 
Many intellectuals fled the country as re-
cently as the 1990s to become critics of its 
policies.2 Others chose to remain inside 
the country, for divergent reasons. Some 
of those “inside” chose to actively support 
the system, becoming its mouthpiece; 
others outwardly submitted to the politi-
cal system while attempting to subvert the 
official discourse. Still others tried to keep 
silent and inconspicuous, somehow trying 
to keep their integrity. Openly opposing 
the system would have meant to expose 
oneself to severe dangers and attacks on 
life and property. Many had already gone 
into exile in the 1960s and ’70s, and now—in 
the post-2003 era—former Baath officials 
are living in exile.
This Iraqi dispute on the freedom of in-
tellectual activity is not only of academic 
concern; it is an ongoing debate among 
intellectuals. The main issue is the atti-
tude toward Saddam Hussein, the Baath 
system, and the wars. Let’s not forget that, 
up to his final days, Saddam Hussein was 
perceived by many on “the Arab streets” 
as a leader who dared to stand up to the 
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West (no matter how heavily he had been 
supported by Western powers during the 
Iran-Iraq War from 1980 to 1988!), as sin-
gle-handedly defending the increasingly 
weakened notion of Arab nationalism, and 
of maintaining “Arab pride.” Arab savior or 
brutal dictator, these conflicting perspec-
tives have led to bitter in-fighting, and are 
mirrored in the dispute about cultural pro-
duction and literary merit. 
Dictatorial, repressive systems tend to em-
ploy intellectual works such as literature in 
the service of politics, thus creating disso-
nance between creative autonomy and the 
societal and political instrumentalization 
of artistic production. Fully aware of the 
inherent power of language and history, 
the Baath apparatus subjected language 
to its own ideology and agenda, abusing 
it to fit its “truth.”3 Bengio rightly speaks 
of the “rape of language” (203-11)4 to 
describe a process whereby official lan-
guage becomes devoid of meaning, yet 
full of phrases meant to construct a new 
reality. Lisa Wedeen’s analysis of the Syrian 
Baath’s system of compliance through hol-
low rhetoric and personality cult (723) also 
applies to the techniques and methods of 
the Iraqi Baath regime. Characterized by 
control, censorship, and the promotion 
of conforming artists, a cultural machin-
ery was established in Iraq which “Baath-
ificated” cultural production and subordi-
nated it to the principles of a monolithic 
literary canon—similar in some aspects to 
the cultural production of the former USSR 
(Kliems, Raßloff, and Zajac). Confronted 
by a dominant ideology paired with a he-
gemonic narrative of self and of history, 
cultural production was very often turned 
into an instrument of state power, reflect-
ing the increasing militarization of society. 
The production of such an identificatory 
literary and historical narrative proved 
vital to the system and the construction 
of a new Baathist identity, with Saddam 
Hussein personally shaping the political 
discourse with his personality cult, choice 
of words, images, and myths (Bengio 123; 
Sassoon 68-9, 76).
The fact that Baathist discourse proved 
strong and exclusive enough to stifle op-
position—at least for a time—and that cen-
sorship and control were tolerated and in 
some sense internalized by intellectuals en 
masse (artists, authors, and writers alike), 
has been explained in various ways. Toby 
Dodge analyzes the relationship of depen-
dency and complicity between the state 
and intellectuals as a “coalition of guilt” 
(66). More sociologically, Isam al-Khafaji 
attests to the “atomization” of Iraqi society 
by the Baath, which facilitated the depen-
dence of the individual on the patron-state 
through a kind of “vertical connection” (79-
80; Davis 7). Sami Zubaida also stresses the 
individuals’ dependence on their relation-
ships with members of the ruling clique. In 
this vein, Kanan Makiya in his analysis of 
state-individual relationship suggests that 
“complicity” (“Is Iraq Viable 30”; “All levels” 
87ff.) played a vital role in the strategy of 
Baathist ideologists since they succeeded 
in co-opting and involving various layers 
of Iraqi society in support—if not always in 
the direct production—of official discourse: 
“The peculiarity of the Iraqi regime there-
fore is to have involved enormous num-
bers of people directly in its crimes over 
twenty years, while making the rest of the 
population at the very least complicit in 
their commission” (Monument 129). Achim 
Rohde stresses the polycratic character 
of Saddam Hussein’s regime which was 
“(…) a bargain between the ruler and the 
ruled, however ‘patriarchal’ it might have 
been, and not a totalitarian one way street” 
(160). Although the analysis of state-society 
or state-individual relations may vary, all 
agree that the linkage between the two 
was tight and direct, preventing opposing 
group solidarity. 
Now, in such a surrounding, what is to be 
expected of an intellectual? What role 
does he take on in society?5 In a broad-
er context, Edward Said has defined the 
role of an intellectual as to “speak truth to 
power” (85-102), echoing Noam Chom-
sky’s famous saying of the mid-1960s that 
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“[i]t is the responsibility of intellectuals to 
speak the truth and to expose lies” (23). 
Vaclav Havel, a writer, activist, and former 
president of the Czech Republic, defines 
an intellectual as someone who
[…] should constantly disturb, should 
bear witness to the misery of the world, 
should be provocative by being inde-
pendent, should rebel against all hid-
den and open pressure and manipula-
tions, should be the chief doubter of 
systems, of power and its incantations, 
should be a witness to their mendacity. 
(167)
This normative view of the qualities 
an intellectual should possess may lead to 
the conclusion that intellectuals usually or 
automatically would oppose established 
authorities. However, juxtaposed to this 
normative approach stands the fact of 
mutual dependency between state and 
intellectuals. While intellectuals hold some 
kind of symbolic power, they are nonethe-
less subordinate to those with economic 
and political power—or, as Bourdieu put 
it, they are “a dominated fraction of the 
dominant class” (qtd. in Karabel 209), and 
there is mutual if ambivalent attraction, 
benefit, and dependence. Once a modus 
vivendi between intellectuals and authori-
ties is reached with intellectuals willingly 
and consciously lending legitimacy to the 
prevailing order in return for privileges 
and other benefits, they will rather work 
toward reinforcing rather than undermin-
ing existing authority, as Jerome Karabel 
has found out. He even comes to the pro-
vocative, sobering conclusion that “what 
needs to be explained is less why intel-
lectuals reach accommodations with the 
status quo than what it is that causes some 
of them, at certain historical moments, to 
rebel” (ibid.). According to him, for intel-
lectuals to resist and oppose the system 
rather than accommodate it, several fac-
tors must be present, among them (1) the 
presence of well-organized groups, (2) a 
high number of “unattached” intellectuals, 
(3) a distinctive identity of the intellectual 
group, (4) a “moderately repressive” sys-
tem that lacks the means and/or will to 
stamp out dissent, (5) divisions within the 
ruling group, and (6) a historically ground-
ed cultural repertoire of resistance (211-14). 
In the case of Iraq, most of these condi-
tions did not exist. As to Karabel’s first 
condition, there were no well-organized 
groups. None of the former opposition 
groups which had formed mid-century 
had remained intact over the course of 
Saddam’s long rule: not the Iraqi Commu-
nist Party which was crushed mercilessly at 
the end of the 1970s, nor Shiite resistance 
movements such as the Daʿwa group, nor 
important scholars like those of the Sadr 
Family. By the mid-80s, all had been si-
lenced or forced to flee in exile. Second 
and third: Intellectuals (writers, journal-
ists, and artists) were mostly embedded 
in some kind of official workplace, usually 
the Ministry of Information and Culture, 
the press, or some other kind of official 
state organization; e.g., they were de-
pendent on the state and the goodwill of 
state officials. This made the formation of 
a distinctive identity of the intellectuals as 
a group difficult; they did not organize or 
even mobilize themselves into collective 
action. Fourth: the political system was by 
no means “moderately repressive” and did 
have the means and the will to crush dis-
sent; and fifth, there were no visible divi-
sions within the ruling clique. If there ever 
had been (as might be deducted by the 
sudden death of Iraq’s defense minister, 
Saddam Hussein’s brother-in-law ʿAdnan 
Khairallah in 1989),6 they were immediately 
and ruthlessly obliterated. The conditions 
for the formation of overt collective resis-
tance were not given. Karabel concludes: 
Put simply, terror works. (…) Given 
the considerable benefits of compli-
ance and the high costs of opposition, 
it is hardly surprising that most intel-
lectuals—including even those elite 
segments of the cultural and political 
intelligentsia most prone to dissent—
will reach an accommodation with the 
powers-that-be. (220)
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Although the decade-long sanctions 
after the disastrous Kuwait invasion with its 
huge humanitarian toll, societal deteriora-
tion, and the international and regional 
isolation of the country harmed the Iraqi 
population immensely, the regime’s suc-
cess in depicting Iraq as the true victim 
of international aggression and injustice 
seems to have fostered an even stronger 
bond of solidarity.
Cultural Production in Baathist Times 
However, one of Karabel’s preconditions 
seems to be met: the cultural repertoire of 
resistance. Within the literary canon, liter-
ary tropes such as the fatherland, death for 
the sake of the fatherland, and the notion 
of the poet as “speaker of the nation” have 
a long tradition in Iraq. Be it in the revolu-
tionary poetry of the 1920 revolution (Tra-
montini, “Fatherland” 161-86); or in nation-
al icons Maʿruf al-Rusafi (1875-1945), Jamil 
Sidqi al-Zahawi (1863-1936) and Muham-
mad al-Jawahiri (1899-1997); or later in the 
committed poetry of Badr Shakir al-Sayyab 
(1926-1964) and his contemporaries up to 
the 1980s and beyond, this feeling of politi-
cal responsibility informed them and their 
audience’s perception of their role. These 
poets created and could refer to a canon 
of easily understood notions and tropes 
with which they fought colonial occupa-
tion, foreign interference, and homegrown 
grievances alike. Now, the question arises: 
How did poets in the Baath era, especially 
in the 1980s, make use of this canon? Did 
they speak truth to power? 
Aiming at producing a kind of literature 
compatible with its ideology, especially 
in times of external threat like during the 
Iran-Iraq War, Baathist cultural production 
made use of this literary heritage and rep-
ertoire with the aim of boosting national 
pride and gaining legitimacy. To mobilize 
and motivate poets and the public alike, 
the notion of national sacrifice was made 
official doctrine in the 1980s. This notion 
had been in use since the 1920s when po-
ets called for resistance against foreign 
domination; in the 80s, however, it was 
perverted into a prescribed and state-
ordered attitude: death for the homeland 
as national duty. As a consequence of this 
Baathification, poetry served as instrument 
for political influence.
Eulogizing the War
As mentioned before, intellectuals had 
several options for how to deal with power. 
The poet ʿ Abd al-Razzaq ʿ Abd al-Wahid (b. 
1930) chose to become the “poet of the 
Qadisiyya” (the official name of the Iran-
Iraq War), eulogizing the war: 
Your free blood is colocynth not to be 
tasted – so show the Persians its taste, 
oh Iraq / (…) // ‘Tis a thousand (years) 
that Rustam’s head is telling – shivering 
while the necks did suffer // ‘Tis a thou-
sand (years) that Qādisiyya is threaten-
ing – fixed in their hearts, unbearable 
(…) // Oh you mountains of iron, hard-
ened by a thousand years – the iron 
mountains amongst us shine forth // 
Oh Saladin who from our sanctuary – 
leapt up so that the horizons raised a 
cry by this // Oh you Euphrates of the 
twenties, oh you Tigris of blessing – 
be proud of them both and surround 
them, oh you comrades // It is your glo-
ry altogether, so rise – it is the eternal, 
the magnificent: Iraq! (8-13; Walther 
86) 
And, addressing Saddam Hussein,
You stood among the people like a ra-
diant lance / you were Iraq, challenging 
and proud // The currents of Tigris and 
Euphrates in your eyes / were churn-
ing, the anger in them a cosmic space 
// You stood like a lance, had anyone 
dared to touch / the skies would have 
split and cracked // All Iraqis’ eyes / 
watched humbly your shining eyes // 
And when you spoke it was as if our 
martyrs / all spoke with your voice for 
us to hear // They told us with your sol-
emn voice that / it is Iraq alone, all other 
talk is false // (…) Oh you, Iraq’s pride 
and glory / oh you best of all brothers, 
leaders, and all. (309, 311) 
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The militarization of the cultural do-
main is obvious since in the first poem the 
diction of the poem echoes official rheto-
ric, switching between denigration (the 
term “Persians” [Furs] instead of Iranians), 
and self-aggrandizing; the reference to 
the historical battle of Qadisiyya in which 
the Persians were defeated by Arabs, to 
great Arab conquerors and military lead-
ers like Saladin, to the strength of the army 
(“mountains of iron”); to the 1920 revolu-
tion which took its course from the Euphra-
tes; and the overarching theme: Iraq, the 
eternal fatherland. The eulogy for Saddam 
Hussein is equally telling: written in 1984 
when no one believed in a quick victory 
anymore and when the death toll was al-
ready quite high, ʿAbd al-Wahid tried to 
mobilize his audience. The identification 
of Saddam with Iraq repeats the official 
rhetoric; in the course of the war, this per-
sonality cult and merging of Saddam with 
the country constituted a major move of 
the Baathist propaganda machinery which 
made criticism synonymous with not lov-
ing the fatherland. Saddam is depicted as 
a menacing figure against his adversaries, 
proud and provocative (like a lance), with 
all the forces of nature (rivers and skies) at 
his command; he is the personification of 
Iraq, with all the people devotedly hang-
ing on his lips (and eyes). It is through him 
that the martyrs appeal to the audience, 
that the defense of Iraq became the high-
est priority.
The Art of Survival: Spaces of Freedom
But there were other ways of dealing more 
subtly with the notion of fatherland, and 
war. A good illustration of the poet’s con-
stant tightrope walk across Baathist dis-
course is ʿAdnan al-Saʾigh, who later on 
became estranged from the official rheto-
ric and increasingly emancipated himself 
from it. Born in Kufa in 1955, Saʾigh served 
at the frontlines in the Iran-Iraq War and—
like all intellectuals working in government 
institutions—was subject to official cultural 
policies, and for a period accommodated 
them to a degree. In the early 1990s he 
went into exile in Sweden (now in the UK), 
becoming a prolific critic of the Baath re-
gime. The following poem is an example 
of how the topos of the fatherland (waṭan) 
can be evoked without falling into the 
propagandistic, martial or nostalgic tone 
of Baathist poets, and without eulogizing 
the war. In his poem “Special condition” 
(1984), in the middle of the Iran-Iraq War, 
he wrote: 
O Fatherland… I carry it in my ribs / And 
travel like the wind behind the words / 
In search / Of a verse / That I can live in, 
/ In search / Of a word that won’t get 
torn to shreds / In the anthologies of 
the poets, / In search / Of a forgotten 
sea / Where no boats will roam with the 
fishers of words, / In search / Of forests 
in the eyes of a woman / Where no bird 
or poet / Is stolen out of the trees of 
her spell, / In search / Of an inch of my 
fatherland / Where no flowers of fiery 
steel blossom / And no revolutionary, 
/ In search / Of a rivulet / Which was 
not crossed over by a passerby, / In 
search / Of a little apple tree / Where 
lovers haven’t carved their first dates, 
/ In search / Of a coffee shop / Where 
Bayātī does not sit… and Ḥussayn 
Mardān, / In search / Of sidewalks / That 
won’t show their beauty to passersby, / 
In search / Of a bridge / On which no 
breeze of Sayyāb’s breath passes, / In 
search of… / O fatherland / Wandering 
has tired me / I slept at your bosom for 
days / Without a poem! (658-59)
Patriotic love is not a sentiment pre-
scribed from above, but rather an indi-
vidual experience of belonging, best de-
scribed as everlasting search. Expressing 
this longing for the unattainable father-
land, Saʾigh evokes a melancholy, reflec-
tive atmosphere devoid of any superficial 
propaganda aims. The fatherland is de-
fined by absence, by the constant search 
for it. However, in sharp contrast to ʿAbd 
al-Wahid’s pathetic tone praising the war, 
Saʾigh reflects the relation between father-
land and poetry. Immediately in the first 
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verses, the search for language and its role 
in society are made clear: Poetry is meant 
to give shelter, to protect, to provide a feel-
ing of belonging and of home. The next 
verse about the words “that won’t get torn” 
constitutes a fairly direct attack on other 
(Baathist) poets who “shred their words.” 
Saʾigh refutes the above-mentioned in-
strumentalization of language in official 
rhetoric, which denies it its basic function: 
to act as counter-discourse and to offer an 
alternative vision of reality. He demands a 
language that remains true to itself, to the 
meaning of words, and does not fall prey 
to hollow slogans. To underline this atti-
tude and to forego the danger of being ac-
cused of being unpatriotic, he recalls the 
older generation of famous Iraqi poets like 
Sayyab, Bayati, and Mardan, whose patrio-
tism is beyond any doubt. For him, the love 
for the fatherland is an individual experi-
ence which cannot be separated from the 
self (“I carry it in my ribs”); not a submission 
to rules from above. This fatherland exists 
in minute spaces where there is neither 
war, nor fighting—only longing for peace. 
So, there were some spaces of “freedom,” 
of maneuvering oneself between censor-
ship and control while keeping one’s in-
tegrity.7 Saʾigh’s poetry demonstrates the 
self-assertion of the poet as an individual 
with his own mind and plans, not subject 
to any external power. The poet and play-
wright Yusuf al-Saʾigh, one of his men-
tors, acknowledges and praises Adnan 
al-Saʾigh’s literary merits straightforwardly: 
The artistic value of this anthology 
confirms one fundamental truth: it is 
the expression of an authentic poetic 
experience (…) it strives to be original 
and keep its very own voice. (…) We 
can be sure that these poems repre-
sent a fundamental contribution to the 
development of a new generation of 
poets who embrace ambition and au-
thenticity.8
Yusuf al-Saʾigh (1933-2005), a former 
communist turned Baathist, was a fine 
poet and an intellectual himself. Accord-
ing to ʿ Abbud, he committed “suicide” (25) 
when finally giving in to Baathist pressure 
in the year 1983. He achieved a high-rank-
ing career (his last official position before 
retiring was director of television and 
broadcast in the Ministry of Culture and 
Information); however, he continued to 
hold onto his clear literary judgment, pro-
viding encouragement to younger writers 
who did not conform to the state-dictated 
patriotism and praise the war. 
Debating Survival and Complicity 
Actively trying from within society to op-
pose the system and fight for freedom 
and democracy is a challenging and very 
often dangerous task; especially in a sys-
tem that does not value dissent and oppo-
sition. In the much more recent context of 
the Arab Spring, Syrian intellectual Sadiq 
Jalal al- Aʿzm warned against outright con-
demnation of those intellectuals who have 
arranged themselves within the system, 
coming to terms and making compromises. 
So does Kanan Makiya, in a way, when he 
judges the collaboration of the Iraqi intel-
ligentsia in “(…) that they chose to live at the 
expense of their art (…). In the conditions of 
Iraq that is an obvious but by no means an 
easy choice to make” (The Monument 124; 
emphasis in the original). However, those 
who became mouthpieces of the regimes 
have lost their credibility and are no longer 
deserving of respect (Naggar).9
In his study Thaqāfat al-ʿunf fil-ʿIrāq (The 
Culture of Violence in Iraq) Salam ʿAbbud 
complains about the Baathists’ literary 
recognition in the Arab world (61-72). He 
strongly condemns the appreciation of 
Sami Mahdi (b. 1940) and Hamid Saʿid (b. 
1941), shapers and makers of Baath literary 
discourse and norms, who were received 
outside of Iraq as great artists having 
enriched the canons of Arab poetry. He 
claims that this was due merely to their 
high party rank; for him, they were “repre-
sentatives of the war” (19).10
After the fall of the regime in 2003, the situ-
ation became yet more complex because 
the intellectuals categorized as “inside” 
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and “outside” in the post-Saddam period 
were not necessarily in the same posi-
tions during Saddam’s rule. Kanan Makiya 
observed that “victims and victimizers ef-
fortlessly changed roles both before and 
after 2003” (“Is Iraq Viable” 6). With former 
Baathists themselves now in exile, a new 
dimension to the inner-Iraqi split has aris-
en. Driven out of the country because of 
their Baathist affiliations, their opposition 
to the US military presence in Iraq—shared 
by many other Arabs, especially in neigh-
boring countries—provides a good oppor-
tunity to present themselves as the victims 
of what has happened in Iraq over the last 
ten years, as “innocent,” a fact which has 
caused anger, grievance, and annoyance 
among many Iraqis. 
In a way, this struggle over representation 
can be compared to the inner German 
dispute after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 
1989. American scholar Andreas Huyssen 
argues that intellectuals of the two Ger-
manies could never really come to terms 
with each other because West Germans 
had been turning a blind eye to the re-
pressive side of the German Democratic 
Republic. Often, West German intellectu-
als romanticized the GDR as a “potentially 
utopian space” and as an antidote to the 
“unloved FRG [Federal Republic of Ger-
many].” This compares to the nonchalance 
of non-Iraqi Arabs vis-à-vis the Baath re-
gime, their common admiration for Sad-
dam Hussein, and their total ignorance of 
the miseries and grievances of the Iraqi 
people and the dilemma of Iraqi intellectu-
als. ʿAdnan al-Saʾigh bitterly laments this: 
Many international and Arab politi-
cians, leaders, scholars, intellectuals, 
poets, and artists came to Iraq without 
any of them worrying about us; they 
just disregarded what was happening 
there, out of various reasons: national, 
economic, confessional or propagan-
distic, while we died and rotted and 
were buried in silence. (694) 
The question of complicity, one of the 
key issues that continue in the German-
German controversy, remains contested 
in Iraqi circles. In retrospect, or in relative 
safety abroad, one tends to judge the in-
tellectuals who stayed inside Iraq during 
the Baath years rather harshly. There, how-
ever, intellectuals developed a variety of 
attitudes and methods for dealing with the 
situation. There was no single manner with 
which to cope with the pressure exerted—
no matter how much it may seem from the 
outside. The war(s) and the praise for the 
Baath system form the main crux of the 
inner Iraqi struggle. However, to come to 
terms with each other and with the past, a 
re-assessment of one’s attitudes is needed, 
on both sides. It remains to be seen how 
intellectuals will proceed from ʿAbbud’s 
auto-critique:
It has to be clear that while being re-
sponsible for the first and the second 
Gulf War and probably for a third one—
if it is his destiny—Saddam Hussein is 
(…) not responsible for the worsening 
of the cultural situation and the turmoil 
among the intellectuals. We, who are 
not responsible for Saddam’s wars, 
bear a heavy responsibility for the pains 
and weaknesses of the cultural sphere; 
all of us without exception bear varying 
degrees of responsibility. (177-78)
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former Leftist, see Yousif. For 
an analysis of Yusuf al-Saʾigh’s 
long poem “al-Muʿallim” (The 
Teacher) and his succumbing 
to the official line see: 
Tramontini, Leslie. “Poetry 
post-Sayyāb. Designing the 
Truth in Iraqi War Poetry 
of the 1980s.” Poetry and 
History: The Value of Poetry in 
Reconstructing Arab History. 
Ed. Ramzi Baalbaki, Saleh Said 
Adha, and Tarif Khalidi. Beirut: 
American University of Beirut 
Press, 2011. 289-312. Print;  
esp. 302.
––› 9  In other countries, similar 
situations prevail: so is the 
Egyptian literary critic Jabir 
Asfour, winner of the 2010 
Gaddafi prize for literature 
and former culture minister 
under Mubarak, despite 
good academic credentials, 
now being accused of being 
the corrupt intellectual par 
excellence because he sided 
with power. Intellectuals like 
the Egyptian writer Sonallah 
Ibrahim demonstrate that 
there are alternative options 
to compliance and co-
option: in the year 2003, he 
officially and publicly refused 
the Ministry of Culture’s 
prestigious literary award 
(and the prize money) on the 
grounds that the ministry had 
no legitimacy and credibility 
for handing out such a 
prize—a scandal which earned 
him a lot of respect. 
10  Further, Abbud 
commented on Sami Mahdi 
(67), and on Hamid Said (174-
75). What draws ʿAbbud’s 
special wrath is that not only 
poets inside Iraq participated 
in the eulogy and flattering 
of those Baathist intellectuals 
but also the ones from exile 
like Saʿdi Yusuf (181). 
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